On Tuesday September 11th, 2001 19 Islamic extremists hijacked four airliners and one of them crashed into the Pentagon near Washington DC, two of them crashed into the World Trade Center towers, and the fourth airliner crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. There were between 5000 and 6000 people killed in the tragedy known as 9/11. The damage done that had to be repaired was estimated to be about $105 billion (Goodrich, 2001). Just a short time after the attacks, a law was passed which created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in November of 2001. Since 9/11, the United States government has spent nearly $100 billion to secure airports (Peterson, 2016). There are many reasons why the United States government, more specifically the Transportation Security Administration, should not continue to spend outrageous amounts of money on the security in airports. This can be concluded based off of the number of attempted terrorist attacks and the fact that there has not been a successful terrorist attack on an airliner since 9/11. There are a number of security measures that were put in place by the TSA; many of which were and continue to be inconvenient to passengers, purely symbolic, ineffective and considered unconstitutional by a number of passengers.

After 9/11, there were a number of changes made so that airports in the United States would be more secure and terrorist attacks could be prevented. According to Goodrich, the following changes were made after 9/11 in airports nationwide: US National Guard members present and armed in airports nationwide, more undercover security personnel, only passengers that purchased a ticket are allowed in the departure gate areas, improvement in screening, random passenger checks, random carry-on luggage checks, x-ray imaging of passenger’s carry-ons, detailed background checks on airport employees, increased surveillance, face recognition technology and more. Some of these implementations were completely necessary in order to keep flyers safe. However, other changes have been and continue to be tedious and less than helpful. 

Since September 11th, 2001, passengers have to arrive two to three hours prior to their flight in order to make it through security. Passengers do not want to spend additional time or effort on this inconvenience. The process of screening passengers lengthens the time that travelers have to spend in security lines and in the airport. Some travelers think that the security requirements are so inconvenient that if the distance they need to travel is short enough to drive, they will. Driving is a much more dangerous way to travel compared to traveling in an airplane. When passengers substitute driving for flying, they are risking their lives (Blalock, 2007). There was an increase of 242 deaths by car accident per month from September 2001 to sometime in 2012 because regular air travelers would rather drive the distance they need to travel than go through airport security (Kenny, 2012). The new security measures reduced the number of passengers willing to travel by air and the demand for airplane tickets declined. This caused the airline industry to lose a total of $1.1 billion in revenue from September 2001 to 2007 (Blalock, 2007). The amount of money lost continues to grow every day just as the creation and implementation of new security technologies and regulations are put into place. 63 percent of travelers said that airport security “is becoming more of a hassle” (Woodyard and De Lollis, 2003). Passengers also think the random searches are inconvenient, as well as the growing list of items that are prohibited from a carry-on. There is a limit on the amount of liquid that can be brought by carry-on which some may find inconvenient. Destruction of luggage from being checked, theft of luggage by airline personnel or loss of luggage by the airline are all inconveniences of the security regulations on baggage when traveling by air. Many people that travel for business, or for short periods of time, have no need to pay the expensive fee to check luggage when they can just bring a carry-on. According to Garrick Blalock, 40 percent of flyers are business travelers. These business travelers would be willing to pay $37 for a one-hour reduction time from the total time spent in the airport (Blalock, 2007). If half of the percentage of flyers that were business travelers decided to drive or not fly, that would be a 20% loss of overall ticket purchases in the airline industry. Not to mention, these business flyers are most likely frequent flyers and purchase multiple plane tickets throughout the year. 

Thomas Birkland mentions that the security implemented in airports, along with the other policies enacted due to the attacks on September 11th, 2001, has been largely for symbolic purposes. Congress must pass policies when an event or tragedy like 9/11 occurs (Birkland, 2004). Otherwise, Congress would receive pressure from just about everyone in the US and probably from people in other countries as well. It would be ethically wrong for Congress to not implement policies with the good intention of protecting Americans and people who may fly to and from the United States. The law that created the Transportation Security Administration was needed and was put in place with said good intentions by Congress; however, the TSA has gone too far in security requirements. Congress also passed a security service tax that airlines could pass onto passengers in the form of higher ticket prices. This causes an even greater decline in the demand of airline tickets. Higher ticket prices and tedious security regulations lead to less passengers and more open seats on flights. This causes airlines to make less money and causes the federal government to receive less tax revenue from the tickets (Blalock, 2007).

The Transportation Security Administration’s regulations for security have proven to be ineffective. Although there has not been a successful terrorist attack since 9/11, there have been a number and variety of weapons to pass through security over the years without being detected at all. Also, the amount of money spent to employee TSA staff and machinery used to screen both passengers and baggage costs are large (Blalock, 2007). According to Alan Neuhauser, the security measures that have been put in place are ineffective in protecting passengers and they are also time consuming. There was a leak in May 2015 that described undercover tests done on baggage screeners and passenger screeners which resulted in a large number of fake guns and explosives that were not identified by screeners in dozens of airports across the US. This proves that there is still an incredibly high rate of weapons that get passed screeners. There was also a review the found that the TSA failed to identify 73 staff members that had potential links to terrorism. $878 million dollars has been spent by the TSA to train staff members in detecting suspicious travelers. Yet, there has not been any proof of the effectiveness of the training. Now that there have been a great number of security checks implemented, the TSA is concerned with the wait times. There are conference calls every two weeks among staff members of the TSA, in which security measures and safety of passengers are not even mentioned because the focus of the passengers and therefore the staff, is on the time spent going through security in the airports. There are constant shifts of resources by the TSA, which cost a lot of money, so that wait times can be reduced, not potential threats. 87% of Americans were unhappy with the Transportation Security Administration. Less than 10% of Americans were confident that the TSA was performing effectively. Multiple large airports constantly threaten to privatize security screening because security lines get to be so long. According to Barbara Peterson, security has been increased greatly in certain areas of airports; however, there are other areas that have no security at all. There have been attacks in the check-in lobbies, checkpoint entrances and arrival areas of airports; places that do not have security regulations in airports in the United States. For example, in the Istanbul Ataturk International Airport, terrorists used rifles in the arrivals floor and departures floor of the terminals (Buchanan, 2016).  The measures that continue to be put into place are also ineffective because the threat of being attacked by a terrorist in the United States declines daily. According to John Mueller and Mark Stewart, the chance that a US resident would die from a terrorist attack is one in 3.5 million. Also, according to Mueller, the number of people that die in bathtubs in the US per year is the same as the number of extreme Islamic terrorist worldwide, excluding war zones. In 2011, the TSA did not catch a single terrorist attempting to board a plane in the US (Kenny, 2012). 

People believe the extensive pat downs, requirements to go through screening systems, and placement of their names without evidence presented onto the “no-fly list” all violate their constitutional rights. There is a raging debate about how far the TSA is allowed to go. There have been numerous cases of extensive pat downs of travelers that were unnecessary. Recently, an elderly, handicapped woman was required to take off her adult diaper after going through a body screening system because TSA agents believed she was hiding something. Many passengers refuse pat downs and avoid airports altogether because of the violation they feel by these security measures. Travelers also refuse body screenings due to the fact that the machines used give off radiation which is incredibly bad for anyone’s health. Repeated exposure to radiation can lead to a number of ill-effects. Nick George, went through security in August of 2009 when he was accused of being a terrorist for having flashcards with the Arabic language written on them. There are a countless number of cases such as George’s in which the TSA accuses people of terrorism for ridiculous reasons and violates their constitutional rights. American citizens have been illegitimately put on the no-fly list by the FBI. They are not told the reason for why they are on the list and they are not allowed to fly until they have been to a hearing. Even after having a hearing, sometimes citizens are not removed from the no-fly list. Ben Wizner, Litigation Director of the ACLU, comments that people should not be sent away from the airport if it is believed that they are legitimate terrorists, they should be arrested. They would only be on the no-fly list if the FBI had reason to believe they were terrorists (Bearden, 2011). 

Irina Manta and Cassandra Robertson write that many of the security requirements put into place lack constitutionality and do not improve the security of airlines. Since 9/11, there has been implementation of something called the “no-fly list”. The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, created and maintains this list. The TSC shares the list with the TSA. Essentially, it is a list of individuals who are known or suspected to have aided in, participated in preparation for, conducted or related to terrorism. The Executive Branch is responsible for deciding what makes someone eligible to be placed on the no-fly list, how they are nominated for it and under what evidence their decision is supported by; all of which is relayed to the TSC. The government has the right to consider the following First Amendment rights as a source for reasonable suspicion for nomination to the no-fly list as long as the nomination is not exclusively based upon: national origin, speech, religion, ethnicity or race. Someone that is on the no-fly list and wishes to be removed may do so by requesting a hearing in which they must defend themselves without knowing why they were placed on the no-fly list and without knowing the evidence presented against them. The no-fly list is ineffective in the sense that the people on the list are accused of being related to or participating in terrorism in some way but are allowed to leave the airport after “appropriate law enforcement agencies” have been notified. Ailsa Change wrote an article in which she mentioned that 90% of individuals on the no-fly list succeeded in purchasing firearms. Other individuals have been allowed to work in airports. The no-fly list is clearly an ineffective tool that has been used as a security measure since 9/11. There is also something called the “selectee” list. The “selectee” list is a list of individuals that must participate in extensive screening. For both the no-fly list and the selectee list, the criteria for being included on either list is unknown by the public. The individuals on these lists are not notified when they are added to them. There have been a number of incidents in which people have been wrongly placed on either list; such as an 18-month-old being placed on the no-fly list due to a computer error. Senator Ted Kennedy was placed on the list because his name somewhat resembled that of a terrorist’s alias (Manta and Robertson, 2016). 

Since 9/11 there have been many new security regulations and implementations as well as improved ones. Most of the security regulations implemented right after 9/11 can be considered necessary in the detection of anything that could cause harm to passengers of a flight in the United States. However, there have been a lot of unnecessary requirements involving security that passengers must comply with in order to fly. These unnecessary and tedious requirements have led to a decline in ticket purchases and overall revenue by airlines and by the federal government. Airline companies should privatize or Congress should pass new policies that require less of the Transportation Security Administration. There is too much money being spent and lost on security in airports that only causes the loss of more money. Passengers do not want to be inconvenienced for purely symbolic and ineffective security measures put in place by the Transportation Security Administration after September 11th, 2001 that violate their constitutional rights. 
