       A drone is an unmanned aircraft controlled remotely. Drone technology has rapidly evolved over the past decade, allowing for utilization by all levels of society. In more recent years, the United States government has developed drone technology for use in surveillance and preemptive attacks on radical Islamic groups overseas. Unfortunately, the laws and regulations surrounding the use of drones were hastily put in place and do not hold the technology to the standard it requires. A severe underestimation of power paired with fallacies in standard drone regulation has caused a problem that needs to be addressed. The government and military essentially have free reign over weaponry that cannot be taken lightly. More specifically, the CIA’s shrouded involvement in this program has increased civilian casualties in drone strikes in Middle Eastern countries including Pakistan, Yemen, and Iraq. Stricter laws need to be put in place to hold these higher powers responsible for the use of this technology and the consequences that may arise with the use of drones.

On October 14th, 2011, sixteen year old American teenager Abdulrahman Awlaki was having dinner with his teenage cousins in Yemen at his house. American officials believed that designated terrorist Ibrahim al Banna was at the house as well. He was not. A drone strike was ordered on the location, and Awlaki was killed in an instant. In the weeks following the strike, the United States government offered no explanation for the death of Awlaki. The only report given to the American public was one by the CIA that that shirked responsibility for the strike, claiming that the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was responsible for the strike. When asked, a JSOC official had no knowledge of the strike being ordered by his department. Abdulrahman Alwaki’s body parts were buried in a mass grave with four other people because not a single person in the strike zone had a body that was completely intact after the strike. The family could not bury their dead in separate graves (Friedersdorf). This story gives a powerful example of the consequences of irresponsible weaponized drone use, and proves that changes in the system need to be made.

       The current laws that regulate lethal drone use are few and far between. Essentially, the United States has found loopholes in international law and taken advantage of them. What started as defensive and reactionary drone strikes on targets in barren battlefields has turned into covert and preemptive strikes in places more civilized and developed (Peterson). For example, there have been strikes near mosques, schools, and even hospitals. A defensive strike abides by international law. In the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), it is stated that, 

“(1) military necessity, which requires that the use of military force (including all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible, which are not forbidden by the law of war) be directed at accomplishing a valid military purpose; (2) humanity, which forbids the unnecessary infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction; (3) distinction, which requires that only lawful targets—such as combatants and other military objectives— be intentionally targeted; and (4) proportionality, which requires that the anticipated collateral damage of an attack not be excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage from the attack.” (Martin)

In a defensive strike, the target has attempted to cause harm to American military, their position is known, and no civilians are nearby. A drone strike wipes them out with no collateral damage in minutes. A preemptive strike challenges international laws in a few ways. In most instances, the target has not yet attempted to cause harm to American military or civilians. Intelligence can be gathered and an educated guess can be made, but the position of a combatant can never be fully confirmed before a preemptive strike. In many cases, civilians are nearby and are killed (Peterson). The deaths of these innocent civilians are one of the many reasons why stricter, more specific international laws need to be put in place.

       The need for more explicit laws is caused by the CIA’s harmful usage of drones. The CIA is to blame for the shift from defensive to preemptive strikes. The original drone law stated that only the military could use weaponized drones for defensive maneuvers. Any use of drones by the CIA was illegal unless strictly for surveillance. Over the past few years, the CIA has tested the limits of this law with no repercussions. Eventually, the breaking of the law was ignored and the CIA’s behavior was deemed acceptable. In order to protect themselves from speculation of international law violations, a variety of loose terms in their strike reports have been used. For instance, it was discovered that the term “combatant” referred to any military age male in the target area (Friedersdorf 2). Using broad terms like this helps the CIA avoid giving accurate statements in their drone reports. In a strike where twenty “combatants” were killed, eight of them might have been innocent bystanders who happened to be military aged males. The use of generalized words, such as “combatant” in strike reports help the CIA save face in their operations (Stack). In many instances, two CIA reports of the same drone strike would not be consistent in the strike time, people killed, and sometimes even the location of the strike (Boyle). This is the major fallacy to be addressed: the inconsistencies in CIA reporting and standards. The CIA’s negligent use of drones illustrates why these drone strikes need to be more closely monitored and have stricter rules and regulations.

       A lack of properly structured laws is not the only issue when addressing the use of drones overseas. The problem begins with the lack of a standard in reporting. The United States Government reported no civilian deaths last year, but upon individual investigation, this was not true. Many news outlets, including the New York times and the Atlantic have gathered individual incident reports and come out with rough estimates, but no one truly knows how many civilians or enemies have been killed in these drone strikes. These outlets attempted to gather their own reports by consulting with towns and cities affected by drones and compiling data based off civilian word of mouth. There is an uncertainty that comes from poor reporting by the government as to how many civilians have actually been killed. This poor reporting leads to news and investigative entities having to discover the truth on their own, resulting in scattered data. Naureen Shah is director of Amnesty International USA's Security and Human Rights Program. She has conducted studies on counterterrorism in the United States. These studies touch on surveillance, the impacts of American Muslim communities, drone strikes, and torture. Speaking of the scattered data, Shah says, 

“Recounting the data, the Columbia Human Rights Clinic found reports of between 72 and 155 civilians killed in 2011 Pakistan drone strikes (specifically by the United States), with 52 of the reportedly civilian dead identified by name – a relatively strong indicator of reliability. By comparison, New America Foundation’s count was just 3 to 9 civilians killed during this period; Long War Journal reported 30 civilians killed.” (1)

In a world of rapidly circulating information, this is an area that cannot be filled with uncertainty. The CIA and United States Government need to be held accountable in their reporting on the strikes that are launched by either the CIA or the United States military. Without being held accountable, both agencies can perform strikes whenever they want to and cover up their mistakes with inaccurate reporting. Accurate, detailed reports should be given for every individual drone strike. Leaving independent news agencies to do their own individual reporting leads to gaps and inconsistencies in each story published. The lack of consistent reporting and omission of information to the public is another reason as to why more specific laws need to be put in place. 

       Since there are no strict laws on strike reporting, individuals have had to launch their own investigations to figure out how many innocent people have been killed by these strikes. Michael Zenko is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He spent five years working for Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He also worked in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning. Although an exact number is nearly impossible to find, Zenko did some number crunching to try to find a ballpark estimate regarding civilian deaths. Zenko found that, 

“An average of separate counts of American drone strikes by three organizations, the New America Foundation, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and The Long War Journal, finds that 522 strikes have killed 3,852 people, 476 of them civilians. But those counts, based on news accounts and some on-the-ground interviews, are considered very rough estimates.” (Shane)

This information reveals why the CIA might be so secretive about their drone campaign. They want to portray to the general public that their drone strategy is accurate and minimizes collateral damage. Reporting a mass amount of civilian deaths would in no way gain the support of the American public. Two things can solve this: A reimagined, translucent drone campaign with higher standards; or keeping the current one in secrecy and continuing operations. The CIA has chosen the latter. The CIA has kept crucial information from the public, therefore, revised laws need to be put into place.

For some experts in the field of military operations, this whole conflict is just a phase in the constant evolution of technological advances in global warfare. Tom Mackiatis is a Professor of History at DePaul University and has helped lead anti terrorism campaigns for the past fifteen years all around the world for his involvement in the U.S. Department of Defense Counter-terrorism Fellowship Program. Mackiatis argues that new weapons are always being introduced that challenge the status quo, and that the law catches up after a certain period of time. For instance, when airplanes and tanks were introduced in World War One and World War Two, the amount of casualties exponentially increased because hand to hand combat was overshadowed by larger and more effective tactics. Many people were upset with the fact that a man could kill other men from far away without a drop of sweat. The honor code associated with battle was challenged. The same concept can be applied to the introduction of cannons, catapults, and even the use of guerrilla warfare in the Civil War. Essentially, Mackiatis is arguing that our sense of morality is not concrete; what is considered morally sound constantly adjusts to the evolution of generally accepted principles in key moral areas. 

Other people remind us of the moral side of this issue. In, “Getting Drones Wrong,” Stephanie Carvin points out the points out the fact that too many people are getting caught up in the excitement of new technology. Carvin is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. She has focused specifically on international security and law, terrorism, and technology. Carvin says that there is often an obsession with technology to a fault: we miss the potentially dangerous effects of said technology (133). The act of killing a human being has essentially likened itself to a video game. In an air conditioned room with a cup of coffee on safe US soil, someone sitting in front of a screen with a remote control can kill dozens of people in an instant. This harsh reality could explain the rapid expansion of this problem. The people ordering these pre-emptive drone strikes cannot see the blood, or see the fear in the person’s eyes before death. This makes it a lot easier to order a strike on information that is not completely confirmed. Killing a person from halfway across the world with the press of a button unfortunately does not weigh as heavy on the conscience as previous forms of killing have.

In his article written for the U.S. Naval Institute, Samuel Lacinski highlights what drones should and should not do. In 2015, Lacinski was one of thirteen seniors given the opportunity for independent research at the U.S. Naval Academy. He was recognized by Aviation Week magazine with the Tomorrow’s Leaders Award. He says that, “A drone used effectively gathers intelligence, disrupts enemy operations, and minimizes collateral damage.” In a perfect world, this would be true. If these standards were upheld, the issues surrounding drone strikes would disappear. His outline for how drones should be used is what the United States should be using. One of the issues with the people in charge of the drone campaign is that they have seemingly thrown basic guidelines like this out of the window.

Along with his general guidelines, Lacinski brings up another important point. Speaking of the some of the consequences of drone use, Lacinski says, 

“While there are potentially significant domestic political concerns (consider the connotation of the word "drone" in the United States today), of greater import to military commanders are the political ramifications in theater, particularly from local populaces. UAV strikes in Pakistan, though conducted in coordination with Pakistani intelligence, have produced a degree of anti-American sentiment in the country.” 

How we decide to use our drones has a lasting effect on our relations with other countries. In many Middle Eastern countries, our reputation is not a good one. The continuation of a corrupt drone campaign will drive the wedge further into our splitting relationship with some of these countries. The fact that other countries are rapidly developing their own drone technology is something to take into consideration. Our actions might not have instant repercussions, but they certainly will in the future.

The development of drones by the United States has been a blessing and a curse. Our country has the opportunity to continue to develop a powerful technology and lead the way in the global stage. If this technology can be used responsibly and with the right guidelines, we could lead other developed countries to creating a world safer with drones, not more dangerous. Allowing the continuation of a corrupt campaign will not give other countries any reason to play fair in the future. The United States should use its pioneer position in the area of drones to create an example laws and guidelines that the rest of the world can follow in the future.

The CIA’s way around international law is their claim that pre-emptive strikes are only performed on people who are absolutely going to harm the country. Although this sounds good, behind closed doors the agency has free reign over the technology. The United States is expecting the CIA to use the technology responsibly with no accountability, and they are not doing that. Banking on inconsistent reporting and shady terminology by an agency shrouded in secrecy to the American Public is dangerous to the United States’ reputation in the global theater.

To solve our nation’s problem with drones, we first need to hold the CIA more accountable for their actions. Serious consequences need to be put in place for inconsistencies in reporting and policies. The CIA should have to report how many people were killed, how many were civilians, and how many were actual threats. The majority of that information is present directly after the strike. Heat signatures from people in the target zone can be seen by the drone. After the strike, the operator of the drone can see how many were killed, wounded, and not affected. As for reporting the breakdown of civilian versus threat, the CIA can follow the example given by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. The Bureau commissioned Pakistani reporter Mushtaq Yusafzai to go to areas surrounding several strike zones and compile reports based on multiple face to face civilian interactions per site. Yusafzai was able to provide accurate reports in every investigation of how many civilians and enemies were killed per strike. The CIA can follow suit by establishing contact with allies like Yusafzai in the countries where strikes are performed.

In a perfected drone campaign, ambiguous words like “combatant” would be erased from drone reports. Real, true reports would be the standard. More policies would be implemented that provide guidelines for when lethal drone force should be used. A system would need to be made that carefully analyzes the risks and benefits of each strike. All reports of drone strikes would be public information. This would give an opportunity for we, the people, to hold the agencies above us more responsible for their actions.

Based on how the United States’ use of drones continues to develop, this issue is something that could affect Americans more personally than they might believe in the future. With countries rapidly developing new technologies, the United States will not be the only country with lethal drones by the end of the next decade. If we do not begin to hold the government and CIA more accountable for their actions, the drones we see in our skies in the future might not be as friendly as we would hope.

  