In history, there are (certain) hot-button debate topics with transcendent validity. Among these are the controversial  abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty, and more. However, from August 6, 1945 through August 9, 1945, a controversy was catalyzed that had direct affiliation with the United States, the United States Military, and the Second World War. This was Harry S. Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Why was it necessary for the United States to resort to atomic warfare against the Japanese? Following the extent of my research, with the books that I have read, the different points of view that I have analyzed, as well as looking into the exact historical context of the time period of Truman’s decision, it is quite evident that the bomb was the best option for Truman. This answer is inherently clear to me due to the fact that the bomb prevented further American casualties, prevented further casualties of Japanese soldiers, averted the mass execution of all Japanese prisoners of war being held in their country, and although it was one massive bomb, did not do much more damage and death than some other American ordered bombings. In addition, some scholars believe the Japanese would have surrendered, and that the United States knew. However, for the Japanese, surrender was not a feasible option because of their military’s mentality, expressed through Gyokusai, on fighting to their very last breath, and considering defeat as dishonorable through their culture. The Japanese were heavily weakened militarily, but their determination to keep from surrendering was strong.

First, the United States had to resort to nuclear warfare against the Japanese because the amount of casualties of American Soldiers would have been dramatically higher without the use of the bomb. According “The Atomic Bomb Averted Even Larger Tragedies” written by Bruce Klingner, a writer for U.S. News & World Report. Klingner begins his argument stating that U.S. government wartime casualty assessments predict that an invasion of Japan, rather than a bombing, would have resulted in 267,000 fatalities (Klinger). Following the war, access to captured Japanese military documents state that Japan had much greater military forces than U.S. officials expected. Truman stated that his goal was to “shorten the agony of the war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans.” The Japanese refused to surrender as a matter of principle. They thought of surrender as cowardly and dishonorable because of their traditions. These ideologies are evident in previous wars as well.. 129,000 Japanese were estimated to have perished from the bomb, which is less than the predicted American toll in total (Klinger). With the immediate end of the war following the bomb, there was no need for a land invasion, and even in the case of an invasion, there is no knowing whether or not the end of the war would have been near (Klinger).

Next, it is important to understand in entirety, with evidence to back it up, that the bomb prevented a multitude of future Japanese casualties as well. Thus far in the war, the Japanese had already lost nearly 3 million soldiers, nearly six times the amount of Americans, and were no longer in ideal shape to be fighting a full force World War with some of the most powerful countries in the World (Dennis). If there was in fact a land invasion rather than a bombing, historians predict that a United States invasion of Japanese beaches would have been one of the most, if not the most bloody battles of the war(Compton). In the rumored November 1st invasion that would have occurred in place of the dropping of the bomb, General MacArthur and his staff  predicted that there would have been nearly 50,000 American casualties as a result of this battle, and several times more than that for Japanese casualties (Compton). Later in this essay, I will further explain the exact plans of the Japanese and their attempt to keep fighting.

Linda Holmes, an author for PBS, wrote an article describing gruesome plans by the Japanese to kill all prisoners of war if the US invaded. The Japanese planned to exterminate 400,000 Prisoners of War upon the instance of a domestic land invasion on Japanese soil (Holmes). The american cryptographer that intercepted these plans of the  Japanese, Stephen H. Green, decoded them as this: “However at such time as the situation became urgent, and it be extremely important, the P.O.W.'s will be concentrated and confined in their present location and under heavy guard the preparation for the final disposition will be made” (Holmes). The disposition mentioned specifically in this instance  concerned this: “Whether they are destroyed individually or in groups or however it is done, with mass bombing, poisonous smoke, poisons, drowning, decapitation, or what, dispose of them as the situation dictates. In any case it is the aim not to allow the escape of a single one, to annihilate them all, and not to leave any traces” (Holmes). If the Japanese were to exterminate all POWs in their country, it would be nearly three times the casualties that the bomb caused, but all Allied soldiers. In an aim to not be invaded, end up losing, and then have all prisoners end up being freed, the Japanese were just going to mass execute them as a whole. Avoiding a mass execution of prisoners is definite grounds for the justification of nuclear warfare. It is evident that the Japanese were clearly not closing in on surrender given the implications of that cryptograph.

In an attempt to negate the relevance of the arguments made by people supporting the bomb, those that advocate against it claim that timely Japanese surrender was inevitable. That could not be more wrong. A week after the bombing, Karl T. Compton, and a few other engineers and scientists that assisted in the development of the bomb had the chance to interview a Japanese military officer regarding the bomb, and what would have happened if the United States hadn't dropped the bomb. They began by asking what he thought the next thing to happen would have been without the bomb, and he responded “You would have tried to invade your homeland with a landing operation on Kyushu about November 1. I think the attack would have been made on the beaches.” He continued to say that he didn't think they would be able to completely repel the invading United States military back out to sea, but understood and emphasized the inevitable gruesome nature of the battle. Following discussion of the concept of a land invasion, Compton asked “What would have happened then?” He replied: "We would have kept on fighting until all Japanese were killed, but we would not have been defeated,” by which this references the dishonor that is associated with surrender in Japanese culture and traditions. They would have lost the battle, but would not have felt as though they had lost because they fought until their very last breath. Incendiary raids on Tokyo killed 125,000 and 100,000 in two separate instances. More than 100,000 more casualties than the atomic bomb. These bombings completely annihilated the 85 densest square miles of the city of the 210 total (Compton). Following the back and forth discussion between Compton and the Officer, Compton continues by describing his time he spent in Japan studying patients impacted by the bomb and measuring the effects. And following that, he states 

From this background I believe, with complete conviction, that the use of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousands—perhaps several millions—of lives, both American and Japanese; that without its use the war would have continued for many months; that no one of good conscience knowing, as Secretary Stimson and the Chiefs of Staff did, what was probably ahead and what the atomic bomb might accomplish could have made any different decision. Let some of the facts speak for themselves (Compton).

It is clear, after this interview, exactly what the mindset of the stereotypical Japanese soldier was. The Japanese officer emphasized their ideologies on defeat and surrender, and stated that they would have kept fighting.

The question to be asked when discussing and debating the morality of the bomb is whether or not Japan had been defeated prior to August 6, 1945. However, the answer is yes and no. In terms of whether or not the war had turned against the Japanese at this point, the answer is yes, they were defeated. However, on the other hand they weren't. They were not defeated in the sense that they were still fighting to their very best ability, and not giving up hope on having to live with the embarrassment and dishonor of surrender.

The trouble that the United States had in forcing the Japanese into surrender stemmed from two pieces of their culture that look at surrender and defeat dishnorably. Along with the problems preventing the United States from being able to force the Japanese into surrender without the use of extreme force, there were two ideals of the Japanese that forbid surrender. This is where a Japanese civilian militia Ketsu-Go comes into play. Ketsu-Go, protect the homeland in English, is a very important part in proving the intentions of the Japanese to stay in the war and fight (“Was it Wrong to Drop the Atom Bomb on Japan?”). This plan was basically, in case of an invasion, American forces would be met on the beaches in which they were invading with as much weaponry and man power as the Japanese had in hope to drive the invading force back to sea. “Japans leaders and especially its military clung fiercely to notions of ketsu-go. In fact, the Japanese government had mobilized a large part of the population into a national militia, which would be deployed to defend the home islands” (“Was it Wrong to Drop the Atom Bomb on Japan?”). Even following the first bomb, some Japanese officials still wanted to resort to this civilian militia. It is somewhat common sense that having all of these untrained civilians wielding assault rifles would not help the toll of the casualties on the Japanese (Dennis).  Along with Ketsu Go, there is Gyokusai which translates directly to ‘shattered jade’(Dennis). Gyokusai was used frequently by higher-ranking officials involved in Japanese military and politics. It is a reference to an old Chinese proverb that is translated to “a great man should die as a shattered jewel rather than live as an intact tile” (Dennis).  Militants used this term to justify suicide attacks notoriously associated with the Japanese military. There is a big ideology surrounding the Japanese military in that they are willing and aiming to fight to their very last breath, and it is evident throughout the war. There is no claim or statement made by any Japanese officials, or people with actual control over the actions of the Japanese military, that there was a plan of imminent surrender prior to the bombing (“Was it Wrong to Drop the Atom Bomb on Japan?”).

The bomb was the only thing that would convince Japan to swallow their pride and accept defeat. Some Japanese officials, if they were well informed and their judgement wasn't clouded by the embarrassment of surrender, saw that they were fighting a bad fight, and their likelihood of winning was incessantly declining (Compton). This, however, just would not be enough to force the Japanese army and population to abandon their historical traditions of fighting until their very last breath and refusing surrender. The atomic bomb, although only accounting for less than 5 percent of Japans casualties, was a huge shock factor (Compton). It was this futuristic, seemingly out of the question tactic that had never been followed through with. By the time the second bomb was dropped, the United States had made their point of how much power they had in the palm of their hand (Compton). With an intense question in the mind of the Japanese on whether or not  this would be the last time they were bombed like this, surrender became feasible. It seems as though this is the most ideal way to paint the picture of exactly why the United States needed the bomb. It was no simple process to understand how they were able to convince the stubborn and proud Japanese into a surrender even though it was against their ideals.

August 10th was the day the Japanese announced their intention to surrender, and then it was made official by Suzuki accepting the Potsdam terms (Perkins). It is tough to say that, without the bomb, the Japanese would have surrendered in a manner that would not have left the ground covered in blood. The timeline directly prior to the dropping of the bomb is as follows: On July 26, 1945, the Japanese were demanded to surrender unconditionally to the United States (Perkins). Next, on July 29 Premier Suzuki issued a statement making it very clear that they were not going to surrender, and ordered for the country as a whole to produce more aircrafts for combat. On August 5th, 300,000 leaflets warning the Japanese of the attack were scattered throughout cities (Perkins). On August 6th, the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and the second on Nagasaki on August 9th (Perkins).

There are a plethora of people that heavily condone the use of the atomic bomb. For instance, in counter to the previously mentioned article written by Klinger of U.S. News and World Report, there is another article written by Peter Kuznick in the same debate column. Kuznick has the polar opposite opinion of Klinger, and does not see any justification or need for the bomb. The first point he makes regards the debate on whether or not the Japanese were already defeated prior to the use of the bomb. Kuznick states that seven of the eight five-star officers in 1945 were militarily unnecessary, or morally reprehensible (Kuznick). However, the bomb was militarily necessary, and the least gruesome of the options presented to Truman. It was necessary because of the incessant refusal of surrender made by the Japanese. The Japanese government issued statements regarding their intent to keep fighting, ordered for more aircrafts to be built for battle, and had a civilian militia assembled as their last resort (“Was it Wrong to Drop the Atom Bomb on Japan?”).

Dropping the bomb, regardless of the destruction and death it caused, was unavoidable after terms of measuring the opportunity cost of a land invasion. The bomb saved lives, the Japanese had no intention to surrender, and a land invasion would have coated Japan’s soil with blood. In a letter written to Irv Kupcinet of the Chicago Sun times, Truman is able to engulf the gist of the justification of the bomb:

Dear Kup:

          I appreciated most highly your column of July 30th, a copy of which you sent me.

          I have been rather careful not to comment on the articles that have been written on the dropping of the bomb for the simple reason that the dropping of the bomb was completely and thoroughly explained in my Memoirs, and it was done to save 125,000 youngsters on the American side and 125,000 on the Japanese side from getting killed and that is what it did. It probably also saved a half million youngsters on both sides from being maimed for life.

…

  I knew what I was doing when I stopped the war that would have killed a half a million youngsters on both sides if those bombs had not been dropped. I have no regrets and, under the same circumstances, I would do it again -- and this letter is not confidential.

          Sincerely yours,

          Harry S. Truman

As bad as dropping a bomb as powerful as 20,000 tons of TNT on a civilian city seems without background information, it is important to understand and analyze the importance of the evidence that is there. Truman had to make a decision, and in this situation, the least violent option was a weapon of mass destruction.
