Over the past decade, Russia has reappeared as a threat to Western interests and national sovereignty in Eastern Europe. The continuing violation of Ukrainian sovereignty that began in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula has placed mounting pressure on Western nations that have vowed to defend their East European allies. But due to the changing nature of the globalized economy, lawmakers are facing new challenges regarding foreign policy aimed at economic and military super powers like Russia.

As a result of proliferation of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, conventional warfare between global powers is no longer a viable option for settling international conflicts. Nations are now more reliant on soft power and aggressive fiscal policy often labeled “economic warfare.” Economic warfare is a term used to describe fiscal policy utilizing tools such as preclusive purchasing, cyber-economic espionage, and most notably, economic sanctions, to influence foreign powers. Despite their label as tools of “soft-power diplomacy,” these weapons of economic warfare often prove equally destructive as conventional warfare. In 1990, the United Nations responded to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait with economic sanctions in the form of a near total financial and trade embargo targeting Saddam Hussein’s regime. The embargo saw near total compliance by the United Nations’ 159 member states. Sanctions devastated the Iraqi economy. The country’s imports were reduced to just 10 percent of what they were prior to sanctions being put in place, and the embargo cut off 97 percent of Iraq’s exports (Alnasrawi). Arguably the most devastating effects of the sanctions were not economic. According to a study of UN sanctions targeting Iraq published in the Iranian Journal of Public health, “There have been many more sanctions-related deaths than casualties resulting from the US-Iraq war in Iraq. Infant mortality rose from 47 per 1000 live births during 1984-89 to 108 per 1000 in 1994-99, and under-5 mortality rose from 56 to 131 per 1000 live births” (Health Services). These dramatic changes in youth mortality rates were the result of poor nutrition and health services affected by UN sanctions. Prior to sanctions being put in place, greater than 70 percent of Iraq’s food supply was obtained through imports. Reports on what percentage of Iraqi drugs and medicine were obtained from import vary between 60 and 90 percent. The economic and public health effects that UN sanctions had on Iraq were so pronounced, UN members voiced concern for the humanitarian effects that the sanctions were having on the people of Iraq and questioned the policy’s morality. Sanctions and other tools of economic warfare may be a growing alternative to armed conflict, but they are often no less destructive than conventional warfare. 

The devastating effects of sanctions in Iraq during the 1990s demonstrate the power of economic warfare when used effectively. But there are few instances in history where economic warfare has been utilized as effectively as it was in Iraq. Critics are quick to point out the numerous failures of economic sanctions throughout the 20th century: the U.S. trade embargo of Cuba lasted more than 50 years, yet the same regime that was in power when the embargo began in 1960 is still in power today. The Kim family remains in power in North Korea, despite over 60 years of Western economic warfare against the rouge state. These failures of economic sanctions to achieve their goal of coercing a target nation to change policy bear the question of how sanctions could be effective against global superpowers such as Russia or China in the 21st century. To answer this question, lawmakers need to take a closer look at the different type of sanctions, and how they work. 

Economic sanctions are put in place to coerce a target nation to create political change. Like any tool of foreign policy, there are varying types of economic sanctions that attempt to reach this goal in distinct ways. According to William Chittick, a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Georgia, there are three classifications of economic sanctions. The first and most aggressive group, comprehensive sanctions, entails a “total embargo of all economic trade and freezing of all financial assets.” The second group, Selective sanctions, are implemented to match the severity of the target nation’s actions. This trimmed down version of comprehensive sanctions targets individuals and institutions, rather than the nation as a whole. The third group is called constructive engagement sanctions. This name is misleading, as constructive engagement relies on the threat of sanctions rather than actual fiscal policy to manipulate a target nation. In addition to these three classifications, Chittick points out that the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving desired goals is tied to whether they are implemented unilaterally or multilaterally (Chittick). It is a combination of these classifications of sanctions and means of implementation that will ultimately determine whether economic sanctions will prove an effective tool of foreign policy. 

By evaluating specific types of sanctions and the way they are implemented, lawmakers can gain a greater understanding of why certain economic sanctions were effective in the past, while others were not. Sanctions targeting Iraq were effective in the 1990’s because they were implemented multilaterally with the support of all of the UN and were comprehensive in nature. On the other hand, U.S. sanctions against Cuba throughout the second half of the 20th century were ineffective because they were unilateral. While the U.S. embargo certainly hurt Cuba’s economy, merchants were still able to make a living by looking to other nations to trade with. Economic sanctions targeting Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia have correlated with falling oil prices and depreciation of the Rubble to create economic instability throughout the country. Despite this economic burden, the sanctions have failed to pressure Russian Officials into withdrawing their support of Ukrainian Separatists. This failure is likely a result of the sanctions’ selective nature. Instead of a total trade embargo, the United States and the European Union both passed sanctions selectively targeting Russian Officials along with specific banks and Defense organizations with known business dealings with the Kremlin. Because the sanctions left out large parts of the Russian economy, there was not enough pressure on the regime from the Russian people to warrant a change in policy. Neither unilateral or selective sanctions create enough economic instability to achieve desired political goals. Multilateral comprehensive sanctions are the only variant powerful enough to coerce a target nation to change policy.

Beyond the specific type to be used, there are other considerations lawmakers must take into account before levying sanctions. Lawmakers must consider the likely political and economic responses a target nation will employ. Additionally, the morality of any potential sanctions must be questioned in regard to potential humanitarian and collateral damages. 

When a regime is targeted by economic sanctions, there are two common responses. First, the target regime may employ propaganda to paint the country that sanctions originate from in a negative light. The target regime may use this propaganda to create a political narrative to garner more support from their base. This strategy has been used by almost every target of economic sanctions over the past century. The Castro regime in Cuba created an Anti-United States narrative to keep support of the Cuban people during economic instability. The Kim Dynasty in North Korea has consistently published Anti-American propaganda to preserve a negative image of the United States among North Korean citizens. And today, Vladimir Putin is pointing to sanctions to further and Anti-Western sentiment among the Russian people. The second common response from a target nation is to pass sanctions of their own. These counter sanctions have proved more effective over the past 30 years as globalization has spread through Eastern Europe and former Soviet States. In response to U.S. and EU sanctions, the Kremlin passed sanctions of their own that halted agricultural and food exports to all EU members and the United States. In a report published in the Journal of Studies in Business and Economics, it was found that Russian counter sanctions were effective in targeting European agricultural markets, particularly in former Soviet States that were heavily dependent on Russia for food imports. “Russia’s ban on imports of food products from the EU meant that as much as 10% of revenue in this sector would have been lost for the EU. Restricting this ban to exclude soft drinks and alcohol decreased this loss to less than 5%, which roughly translates to $ 6 billion. $ 1 billion of this loss is incurred by Lithuania alone” (Christian). 

To overcome these challenges, lawmakers must embrace international cooperation when levying sanctions. By enacting sanctions multilaterally, a clear message is being sent to the target nation and its people that the world will not stand by in silence as a regime violates international law. This message of unity, paired with the inevitable economic instability that multilateral sanctions bring over time, will outlast any political narrative. To mitigate the negative economic effects brought about by counter sanctions, nations must temporarily lessen restrictions on trade between non-offending parties. This can alleviate uneven financial burdens brought about by counter sanctions by allowing particularly hard-hit nations to fill trade deficits through easier access to other markets. 

One major criticism of economic sanctions over the past decade is their potential for collateral damage. Due to the globalized nature of the economy in the 21st century, the harmful effects of sanctions rarely stop at the target nation’s borders. The potential for collateral damage creates a tense environment for legislators trying to pass sanctions unilaterally. In response to Russia’s alleged meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Congress is considering passing new sanctions targeting Russian energy and steel exports. These sanctions are particularly controversial, as Russia provides over 30 percent of EU oil imports and more than a quarter of solid fuel imports (Dreyer). Economists have argued that the new U.S. sanctions would result in fuel shortages and rising energy costs. The prospect of unilateral sanctions has created unease in the international community. Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, has been a vocal critic of the proposed U.S. sanctions. Juncker argues that Congress is obligated to collaborate with the EU in the creation of these sanctions, as the EU is likely to feel severe collateral damage. Juncker has even gone as far as threating retaliation if the U.S. passed the sanctions without EU cooperation. “We will respond with counter measures if need be,” Juncker said at the G20 summit in Hamburg this past July, “within a few days— we won’t need a few months for that— we could react with counter measures” (Erlanger). Juncker’s threats highlight the risks that collateral damage from economic sanctions pose to international relations. The only solution to these challenges is to collaborate and enact sanctions multilaterally through supranational organizations. By going through these organizations, collateral damage is more likely to be tolerated and mitigated, and sanctions will be more effective at achieving their political goals. 

If sanctions are utilized in an effective manner, then a target nation will experience economic instability great enough to require that the political demands of those levying the sanctions be met. For this to happen, much of the economic burden created by sanctions has to be shouldered by the people from which the regime bases its support and legitimacy. This bears a moral question of whether the humanitarian toll brought about by sanctions is justifiable for the political goals they achieve. Lawmakers must balance the damaging humanitarian consequences that sanctions have on innocent civilians with the need to address a target nation’s offenses. This challenge is what U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley highlighted in her speech on North Korea this September. “The time has come to exhaust all diplomatic means to end this crisis, and that means quickly enacting the strongest possible measures here in the UN Security Council. Only the strongest sanctions will enable us to resolve this problem through diplomacy. We have kicked the can down the road long enough. There is no more road left” (Haley).

In the coming years as conventional warfare continues to decline in favor of diplomacy, the use of economic sanctions is likely to come to the forefront of foreign policy. A better understanding of different types of sanctions and how they are used will be essential in keeping military and economic super powers in check and preventing armed conflict in the increasingly globalized world. 
