What can motivate an individual to commit an act as atrocious as a gory beheading of another human being? The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria did just that in late 2014, decapitating in excruciatingly detailed viral videos American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff. The alarm felt by the American public, perhaps somewhat unjustifiably considering Americans are much more likely to die from other forces than terrorism (Coleman), prompted changes in attitude in regard to national security and public safety not seen in the United States since September 11th, 2001, and ISIS gained rapid international notoriety. Because the roots of Islamic terrorism are a hotly debated issue, arguments as to its continuation have contemporarily resolved into a debate about just how bad the religion, not its extreme elements, really are, forgetting of course the violent nature of the overwhelming majority of all archaic religious texts. A true method to the madness must be discovered, however, especially since the general American consensus seems to be that Islamic terrorism posses the greatest single threat to America's national security. Hopefully, by examining the why of Islamic terrorism, we can discover the how to defeat it. While religion is certainly the underlying foundation for Islamic terrorism, its roots lie instead in a combination of religious, historical, and geopolitical factors, which can be examined through discussions of prominent groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. 

While the roots of Islamic terrorism are certainly varied, its underlying foundation lies in an archaic interpretation of the literal violence depicted in pre-medieval religious texts. While other factors certainly play a role in Islamic terrorism, the religious aspects of its inception and existence cannot be ignored. Some fear any discussion of Islam's role in terrorism, out of politically correct nervousness. Many believe that any discussion of radical Islam "fail to avoid subsequent expressions of prejudicial material," however, there is no clear way to combat an ideology without discussing it in its entirety (Jackson 402). In recent years, jihadists have become more highly educated and from wealthier families, defeating the notion that terrorism is bred in conditions of poverty and placing greater emphasis on the importance of theology over socio-economic factors (Bergen). This defeat of the cliche that terrorists come from poverty is not exclusive to Islamic terrorism, but other forms as well. Left-wing terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s "were sometimes accused of belonging to an idle middle class that exploited the misery of a different class," demonstrating how ideology is a much more important determinant of terror motivations than socio-economic factors (Victoroff 20). Terrorism and the methods Islamic terrorists use such as suicide attacks "is not an Islamic phenomenon by definition," although it is important to note that "the lion's share of terrorist acts and the most devastating of them in recent years have been perpetrated in the name of Islam" (Bar). Of course religion plays a role in Islamic terrorism because "when a masked executioner says Allahu Akbar while beheading an apostate, sometimes he's doing so for religious reasons" not because of the politically corrective narrative that that executioner is "un-Islamic" and is an unfortunate and inevitable product of a culture hindered from progress by oppressively interventionist foreign and dictatorial local regimes (Wood). Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other Jihadist groups parallel "the jihadist wing of a branch of Sunnism called Salafism," which specifics that the worshiper follow Muhammed and his closest followers in all aspects of life (Wood). In terms of the Islamic State, it has a clearly codified theological ideology that affects every aspect of its existence. The Islamic State "rejects peace as a matter of principle," and that this violence is motivated by a hardline religious doctrine that "make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change" (Wood). This violence stems in part from the belief that ISIS is ushering in a kind of Islamic rapture, where the return of the messiah will bring about the immanent apocalypse, and all true believers will ascend to heaven. The Islamic State differs theologically from groups like al-Qaeda in its belief in the institution and timing of a Caliphate (an Islamic theological dictator who intends to conquer the world in the name of Jihad). Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, calls pledging allegiance to a caliph a "communal obligation of all Muslims," providing one reason for the Islamic State's infamous ability to recruit foreign fighters (Wood). The caliphate is also important because ISIS has recently claimed that all Muslims must pledge allegiance to the caliph before achieving salvation, providing both an important recruiting tool and another example of religion's significance in Islamic terrorism (Wood). The Islamic State's creation of their violent caliphate is motivated by the idea that "it considers itself a harbinger of- and headline player in-the imminent end of the world" (Wood). Their entire strategy and means of existence as a Quranically prophesied caliphate hinges on this belief about the day of judgement. Al-Qaeda, in contrast with ISIS, is "flexible, operating as a geographically diffuse network of autonomous cells," whereas ISIS "requires territory to remain legitimate, and a top down structure to rule it," explaining ISIS's territorial expansion (Wood). The Islamic State's need for territory is also an important factor in understanding its methodology. In order to maintain its legitimacy as a Caliphate, it must maintain a geographic area of control. Therein lies the reason for ISIS's unique nature: it is more of a threat within the Middle East itself rather than the West because it requires territorial control and expansion, and this emphasis on territory makes it unique among Islamic terror groups. 

Although Islam is the underlying foundation for groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, this results less from inherent problems with the aspects of worship in the religion and more in ISIS's and other group's interpretations and applications of the prophetic methodology. The Islamic State, in contrast with al-Qaeda, "has no secular or political agenda," but rather is entirely motivated by a "carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment," meaning creating a Caliphate grounded in the rule of Sharia law (Wood). The Islamic State's followers' main mission in any aspect of life is to conduct themselves in a way as identical as possible to the life of the Prophet Muhammed. Followers of the Islamic State "insist that the will not-cannot waver from governing precepts that were imbedded in Islam by the Prophet Muhanned and his earliest followers." (Wood). Violence by such individuals such consumed in their misguided faith is not surprising if their main motivation is to live up to the example set by the Prophet Muhammed, who was a violent warlord that executed his enemies and members of other religions (Arlandson). While violence and atrocities occur in most major religious texts, considering the time at which they were written, it is not surprising that followers of the Islamic State, bent on living as closely paralleled to Muhammed as possible, would commit the acts of violence that they do. The theological reasons for Islamic terrorism, then, are more of a product of a lack of progressive cultural and religious change in Muslim countries as a result of an oppressive fundamentalist society, directly leading to an inevitably violent and archaic legal and ethical code,  than based on  systemic ethno-religious propensities for violence. Examples of the Islamic State's adherence to a medieval religious code, which drives its violent expansionism, are evident in statements by its spokesmen. A secular terrorist group would doubtfully call on its supporters to "find an infidel and "smash his head with a rock," poison him, run him over with a car, or "destroy his crops," but this kind of language is normal in fundamentalist Jihadism (Wood). This points to another major piece of evidence that supports the belief that Islam is an inherent cause of global jihad, because if ISIS was not religiously motivated from a foundational level, would they have used religious imagery? Further evidence supporting Islam as a negative factor in the continuation of Islamic terrorism is the fact that this kind of language parallels language found in the Koran, helping to defeat the notion that terrorism is "un-Islamic." The destruction of crops and poisoning of well water, for example, is an allusion to "orders from Muhammed to leave well water and crops alone-unless the armies of Islam were in a defensive position" (Wood), demonstrating how Islamic terrorists, especially the Islamic State, follow a path of Jihad codified in the Koran. It also less concretely points to the significance of the US and the Western World as an enemy of the Islamic State. The "armies of Islam" being "in a defensive position" abstractly advances the belief of the Jihadist that this "defensive position" is a direct result of the Kuffar (the infidel West and the United States) (Wood). Therein lies evidence of motives for the violence of ISIS fighters as well as their hatred of the West and the extent of the brutality of their Jihad. 

The Islamic State certainly does not adhere to contemporary, widely-accepted interpretations of Islam, and its nature as a terrorist organization stems in a theological sense stems more from a certain reading of scripture as opposed to an inherent systemic problem in the religion. Like Christianity or other religions, Islam is sectarian and nature, and not all practitioners follow this form of extremism. Islam's sectarian nature can in fact be dangerous, as "the entirety of radical Islamic groups did not need to coalesce into a single force to inflict severe damage," although this also demonstrates the marginalization within the Muslim community of extremists (Czwarno 672). The fact that "the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam" is reflective of how failing to understand ISIS and jihad's religious nature and dismissing terrorism as "un-Islamic" in the name of political correctness will ultimately prevent jihad's defeat by constricting the ability of the Muslim community to meaningfully discourse with its more extremist elements to prevent the rise and continuation of groups like ISIS (Wood). If the ultimate goal of every Islamic State's policy is to follow the life of Muhammed explicitly- the "Prophetic methodology," then clearly theology is the foundation of the Islamic State's entire existence (Wood), and thus religion cannot be ignored for the sake of not offending the sensitive in any discussion of Islamic Jihad. The problem with this specific brand of Islam practiced by ISIS is that the "Leaders of the Islamic State have taken emulation of Muhammed as strict duty, and have revived traditions that have been dormant for hundreds of years," such as harsh practices like crucifixions (Wood). Here, another case of Islam's relationship with Islamic terrorism is highlighted, as issue at stake is the rebirth of brutal medieval traditions contrary to contemporary Islamic worship.  

Contemporary Muslims certainly do not practice the same brand of Islam as jihadists. A study by Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plumper found that "the Islamic civilization is not per se significantly more drawn to inter-civilizational terrorism," although the study also noted that terrorists from predominantly Muslim countries attack the West much more frequently than fighters from other countries (730). The violence of Islamic terrorism results more from interpretations of scripture than with systemic problems within the ideology of the religion itself, this by no means absolves Islam. Islamic regimes have existed for centuries, even "moderate" ones like Saudi Arabia make Americans cringe, and historical Islamic kingdoms have a record of brutal violence. Middle Eastern and conservative Muslim culture is also disturbingly oppressive to women, non-Muslims, and "outcasts" such as homosexuals. So no, Islam is not necessarily a global religion of peace and brotherly love. While Islam does not inherently lead to jihadist terrorism without external factors, its existence as terrorism's foundation is disturbing. There also seems to be some perception that terrorists are brainwashed victims rather than passionate religious warriors. This is, of course, false. The average fighter of the Islamic State is heavily religious, "deeply infused with religious fervor" and are educated in scripture, as evidenced by how "Koranic quotations are ubiquitous," demonstrating how the average Islamic State fighter is not a mindless pawn for a larger geopolitical issue, but is rather one with carefully considered and venerated beliefs (Wood). Islamic State fighters are largely a throwback to Muhammed's soldiers during his time as a warlord. In contrast with the highly technical, cell-style terrorism of al-Qaeda or images of brainwashed, "un-Islamic" fighters, "the fighters of the Islamic State are authentic throwbacks to early Islam and are faithfully reproducing its norms of war," further providing evidence that violent jihad is scripturally and historically legitimate as a school of Islam (Wood). Clealry, Islam is the underlying foundation for Islamic terrorism.

But what about the other types of terrorist: one un-motivated by Islamic goals? An understanding of the reasons for the existence of Islamic terrorists is only complete with an understanding of the motives of terrorists as a larger, more diverse group. Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks have compiled several hypotheses as to why global terrorism exists, among them "Economic Deprivation, Modernization Strain, Institutional Order, Political Transformation, Identity Conflict, Global Order, and Contagion," that give potential academic theories as to the motives of terrorists (5). Of these, Islamic Terrorism is linked to a combination of a multiple of these factors. Most interesting to note is the "Identity Conflict" hypothesis which is closely linked to religious groups, who often resort to terrorism due to "religious fractionalization" (Krieger and Meierrieks 5). It makes perfect sense that jihadists, seeing the liberalization of their religion, would have resorted to terrorism both as a reaction to progressive theology and as secular statements against the interventionist foreign governments that, according to many hardline Muslims, have caused this sudden lapse of piety. 

In addition to religious factors, geopolitical factors have contributed to Islamic terrorism as well. Most, if not all of these geopolitical issues are as a direct result of America and the West. Academia has long held that "international anarchy, U.S. hegemonic intervention in Islamic societies, and fundamentalist Islamic belief systems," demonstrating how US intervention and their creation of power vacuums in regions with highly sacred religious traditions that preach animosity towards nonbelievers probably is not the best solution to prevent violent attacks against America (Thayer and Hudson 40). Interventionism by foreign nations in Muslim lands has played a definite part in the proliferation of terrorism in that region. The Middle East, steeped in Sharia law and conservative customs and traditions, does not respond well to progressive change from outsiders. Anti-western violence in the Middle East is "generated during the transition from having a traditional to a modern society," essentially boiling down to anger over cultural changes perceived to have been caused by the progressive, pop-culture United States (Tim Krieger and Daniel Meirerrieks). Intervention, by extension, has more a a negative impact than a positive. Even the American government admits intervention creates tension. The 9/11 Commission found that "the primary driving force for Islamist terrorism was anger at U.S.-led foreign policy in the Middle East," demonstrating how violent undertones in Salafist Islam coupled with an invading army on the doorsteps of Mecca leads to terror attacks on American soil (Carpenter). While religion is the foundation for Islamic terrorism, the actual event that causes a terrorist to commit violence seems to be sparked by anger over a specific instance of American execution of interventionist foreign policy.

If intervention is a negative solution to combat terrorism, then the United States has been operating under flawed policies for decades. Since American military involvement in the region began in 1982 with intervention in Lebanon in support of Israel, America "has been almost continuously imposing punishing economic sanctions on, bombing, or invading Muslim countries," creating an atmosphere of constant tension and anger against the West (Carpenter). No wonder ISIS thinks that the armies of Islam are in a "defensive position," singling the beginning of the rapture, when an invading army has been operating in the region for a half-century. Having the United States and its allies as a common enemy have created a web-like relationships between jihadists and jihadist groups. ISIS, for example, was technically founded by Abu Musa'b al Zarqawi, the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq during the United State's invasion, before ISIS split with al-Qaeda after its current head, Ayman al Zawahiri, failed to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi, the head of ISIS, and acknowledge him as caliph.  (Wood). Al-Qaeada in Iraq was founded as a direct result of the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq following 9/11, which was a direct result of American intervention in the Middle East during and after the Cold War, with the Gulf Wars, and in their support of Israel. Had the United States not intervened in the Middle East as they had, al-Qaeda never would have initiated the September 11th attacks, the US never would have invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, and AQI would never have even existed. Had al-Qada in Iraq not been founded (as would have been the case had the United States not invaded), neither would ISIS, and thus the chronological effect of foreign interventionism becomes apparent. The United States intervened in Iraq and removed Saddam Hussein, who had been really the only source of stability in a region where violently opposed Sunnis and Shias live, of course resulting in sectarian violence. The power vacuum created by the removal of Hussein provided a breeding ground for terrorism. Hussein, a brutal dictator, had the ability to oppress terrorist groups, as "Autocratic regimes  can capitalize on their capability of repression" to deal with terrorist threats (Krieger and Meierrieks 7). Not only did the deposition of Saddam Hussein create a power vacuum, it also led to the instillation of a US-backed democratic government. This had the adverse effect of more anger in the region over US intervention coupled with the ability of terrorist groups to prosper without the constraints of an authoritarian regime, as the new regime's "obligation to civil liberties" as a democracy prevented it from using "harder" methods to combat internal terrorism (Krieker and Meierrieks 7). The US invasion and occupation provides one of many examples of how negatively impactful foreign intervention can be in combating terrorism. In addition to the invasion of Iraq, the invasion of Afghanistan played a role as well, inciting jihadist support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. These invasions, "and the subsequent stabilization of pro-Western deomcracies" had the significant unforeseen effects of "seem[ing] [to] spur Islamic anti-Western terrorism," clearly defeating their original purpose of defeating it (Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plumper 732). 

While religion and geopolitics certainly play a role in Islamic terrorism, history has had an affect as well. The history of Islamic terrorism can be traced to the Wahabis of 18th Century Arabia, who "conquered most of what is now Saudi Arabia, and their strict practices survive in a diluted version of Sharia there," reflecting the modern origins of expansionary jihad and strict Sharia-based legal systems (Wood). The Wahabis created, in some extent, a kind of revival of enthusiasm for jihad and Sharia on the Arabian peninsula. Modern jihadist movements can be traced to "the colonial era, failed post-colonial attempts at state formation, and the creation of Israel" that, across the Muslim world, "endengered a series of Marxist and anti-Western transformations and movements," giving rise to groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Moore). 

The history of the Islamic State is also important in understanding the reasons for Islamic terrorism. The Islamic State was born as a result of a schism in the al-Qaeda umbrella that resulted in the creation of ISIS and al-Nusra, its al-Qaeda counterpart in the region. One factor in the split was Zarqawi's methodology and finite differences in doctrine between Zarqawi and Maqdisi, the ideological head of al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden's principle advisor. Zarqawi favored a system of Jihad that elicited vivid images of gore, his "penchant for bloody spectacle," that he theorized would be the most effective form of terrorism (Wood). Another issue in al-Qaeda/ISIS relations is Zarqawi's "hatred of other Muslims, to the point of excommunicating them and killing them," while al-Qaeada and Maqdisi's school of thought was that this practice of takfir (excommunication and execution) created a cliche slippery slope, because according to scripture "If the accuser is wrong, he himself has committed apostasy by making a false accusation" (Wood). The Islamic State has drastically expanded the definition of apostasy. In conjunction with their belief in the Salafist Prophetic Methodology, they have outlined a range of behaviors making Muslims apostates, including Shiites, helping to administer a case of the sectarian violence in the Middle East that has become synonymous with Islamic terrorism (Wood). In coordination with an expansion of takfiri doctrine and coupled with ISIS's need for territorial expansion, ISIS fighters murder "apostate" Muslims in large numbers, explaining in part the sheer numbers of those killed by the Islamic State.

Islamic terrorism is not "un-Islamic," although it does not represent the views of the overwhelming majority of Muslims. Problems with Islamic terrorism arise when those with near-radical or radical beliefs are prompted into action from external factors, like U.S. intervention. However, Islamic terrorism cannot be dismissed as secular in nature; its theological basis is the key to understanding its success, and hopefully, lead to its demise. Ultimately, in order to defeat this threat to Western civilization, one must analyze the geopolitical, historical, and religious components of the inception and existence of jihadist terrorist groups. 

