  For years the topic of concussions in football has been gaining the attention of players, families, and spectators alike. The buzz around this topic has escalated to a point that has       demanded the attention of leaders in the National Football League to enact changes and produce a safer game. Death and suicide of former NFL players has triggered the movement to further study the brains of athletes who have sustained traumatic blows to the head over their professional athletic careers. This led to the discovery of Chronic Trauma Encephalopathy, or CTE. The ever-developing study of CTE has yielded controversy over the legitimacy and scope of the disease and diagnosis. The NFL has since implemented new concussion protocol and donated millions of dollars to brain trauma research, in order to appease public opinion on the issue. New regulations have lead some to argue that, given the nature of the game, the NFL has done all it can do for its players. Many players and player's families have illustrated their disagreement with that opinion through lawsuits against the League; stating that the organization did not fulfill its duty to its players by allowing them to play with traumatic injuries. Although the League has only lost in court a small percentage of the time, their real loss is in the public eye. By undermining research and ignoring evidence of danger, they have endangered the future of the sport. Though the NFL has consistently tried to hide the effects playing, they cannot change the fact that football is an inherently dangerous game. The present danger is a factor that the NFL, or any contact sport organization, can never fully discount while maintaining the characteristics of the game. The NFL has an incredibly powerful influence over America. As one of the largest organizations, they cherish the ability to spare no expense carefully crafting the image of professional football. However, as time progresses, people with opposing views to the NFL are gaining more platforms to spread information through the media. The media's ability to publicize information the NFL has been trying to hide about CTE will inevitably lead to the demise of the national football league. 

  The "concussion issue" standing before the National Football League is centered around the development of Chronic Trauma Encephalopathy (CTE) in player's brains, yielding their loss of self and general livelihood. CTE is defined biologically as "atrophy of the cerebral hemispheres, medial temporal lobe, thalamus, mammillary bodies, and brainstem, with ventricular dilatation and a fenestrated cavum septum pellucidum" being a "distinct, slowly progressive tauopathy with a clear environmental etiology." In a more general sense, CTE does cause a physical change in the brain that can be seen in patterns on a microscopic level. For most people, however, who are not looking at the physical changes of brains, CTE is commonly recognized by or associated with "memory disturbances, behavioral and personality changes, Parkinsonism, and speech and gait abnormalities" similar to dementia or early onset alzheimer's. A leading neuropathologist Bennet Omalu was the first to link CTE to professional football in 2002. He discovered it by accident after being assigned the autopsy of beloved 1980's Steelers center Mike Webster. Webster was one of the most iconic players on the powerful Pittsburgh Steelers defense known for their extremely combative and effective blocking earning them the nickname of 'The Steel Curtain.' Despite Webster being a heroic, beloved figure in the eyes of Pittsburgh citizens, in the years after his retirement, he gradually derailed his life and family. He lost his cognitive function, sanity, fell into poverty, became addicted to drugs, was unable to sleep, was extremely ill and incoherently solving his medical problems by ducting his feet, supergluing his teeth back into his head, and taking himself to sleep each night.  Eleven years after retirement Webster died of a heart attack at age fifty. Omalu observed that Webster appeared far too worn out for a man of his age and took the opportunity to examine his brain, expecting to find signs of dementia. Much to his surprise, the beloved Steeler's brain appeared normal. Omalu then launched a detailed investigation, dissecting the brain to find what had caused the players life to deteriorate so quickly. After observing and studying the characteristics of CTE found in Webster's brain, Omalu consulted other top neurosurgeons, doctors, and scientists in the field examine his work. They all agreed: Mike Webster had Chronic Trauma Encephalopathy. 

  Omalu and his colleagues attributed these physical changes to the repeated blows to the head Mike received each week while on the field. Dr. Robert Stern, a neuropsychologist at Boston University put Webster's level of trauma into perspective by explaining "in football, one has to expect that every play, game, and practice they're hitting their heads against each other ...  Those things seem to happen around 1000-1500 times a year. Each time that happens, its around 20 g or more. That's equivalent to driving a car 35 mph into a brick wall. 1000-1500 times per year." The group of neurosurgeons in Pittsburg lead by Omalu published a paper detailing this revolutionary connection between professional football and CTE; along with expanding the limited knowledge available on the disease. The paper was published in the Neurosurgery Medical Journal. This journal had previously published multiple articles from the NFL scientific committee: Mild Traumatic Brain Inquiry (MTBI). This committee was headed by the New York Jet's team doctor (a rheumatologist), and further consisted of other NFL loyalists and team physicians. None of whom had any background in the neurological field, but yet, all of whom were aggressive believers in the ideology that concussions were not an issue to be concerned with. Upon Omalu's publication directly liking professional football to the deteriorating brain disease, the NFL's committee immediately attacked his claims stating he did not understand modern science and called for the retraction of his work, blatantly stating it was "completely wrong." The NFL used its larger ability for publication to try to overrun Omalu's research and dissuade any negative attention that might be drawn to the league.

  The NFL committee's brazen rejection of Omalu and his research was not the first time the organization had tried to carefully shape football's scientific connection to concussions to appease the public. The Mild Traumatic Brain Injury committee had begun publishing in the Neurosurgery Medical Journal in 2003; rigidly assuring all concerned that there was absolutely no connection between a player hitting their head in football, and health issues later in life. As advocates that concussions were not a serious injury, their reports stated players would be able to return to the same game after sustaining a head injury without any further risk of damage. Dr. Robert Cantu, editor of the journal's sports medicine section, tried to reject these papers as he did not believe the studies to be sound nor the conclusions to be factual. However, the journal's editor and chief was not only a top consultant for the New York Giants, but also an author of some of the studies and a member of MTBI. The committee in total published sixteen papers; all assuring "definite denials" of any correlation or causation between the NFL and brain trauma in players. The committee and their studies served as a appealing front for the NFL to pledge to the public that they were doing research to study potential dangers of the game. The scientists the NFL put to work are a cornerstone piece to their denial of liability in regard to player injury. It allowed the NFL to consistently push back any confrontation about the dangers of football; offering simply that they were looking into the issue. 

  Overlooking Omalu's refusal to retract his work, his continuation to post further findings, and his ability to be the first to provide physical evidence of CTE in the brains of multiple former NFL players, the League chose to publicly ignore his existence and maintain their current stance on the concussion issue. In the single instance where Omalu was able to privately meet with an NFL doctor, Omalu expected to have an opportunity explain his findings and perspective on the issue. The NFL doctor however was not interested. During their meeting he asked Omalu several times "do you know the implications of what you are doing?," to which each time Omalu replied that, indeed, he was aware. The doctor rejected that answer until he finally retorted: "no you don't. If 10% of mothers in this country would begin to perceive football as a dangerous sport- that is the end of football." Although the private, unofficial manner of the remark, the doctor indicated league's awareness of  how paramount the image of safety is to the future of professional football. By overtly disclaiming Omalu's work, the professional football empire demonstrated their tactical ability to captivate the public with their version of the truth. As a beloved piece of American culture, and as the one of most profitable and cooperations in the nation, the NFL also exudes an extremely high level of credibility. They have the means and ability to quickly address the entire country that opposition, like Bennet Omalu, simply does not have. This ability plays a large role in the NFL's expertise in swiftly diverting the public's attention away from the concussion issue for over a decade. However, as more research is being published on a grander scale for more of America to see, it is becoming more difficult for the NFL to continue denying these powerful claims.

  Despite the NFL's oppressive efforts, research on CTE continued to gain momentum. As the concussion issue more consistently came to light, the NFL commissioner stepped down, allowing Rodger Goodell to assume the position in 2006. Goodell immediately reworked the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury committee placing Dr. Casson, a leader in the field of neurology at the head of his team. Casson was far more qualified to fill the role of scientifically representing the NFL. However, much like the last committee, he was very vocal about his disapproval of Omalu's work. In his first days on the job, in an interview, Casson shot down all questions of footballs association with long term health issues by firmly saying "no" to every single question. To address the growing public concern surrounding concussions, in the summer of 2007 Goodell and Casson held  a concussion summit inviting coaches and doctors from each team as well as all of the leading minds surrounding the issue of concussions. The key player absent however, was the single most knowledge person requiring CTE, Omalu; who was excluded from the conference entirely. Omalu's partner, respected former Steelers team doctor Julian Bailes, presented the information in his place. Regardless of the evidence provided, Casson was not subtle about his doubt and disregard for Bailes' entire presentation; setting the tone for how the entire cooperation viewed the case. Goodell had now witnessed presentations from all the lead neurological researchers outlining the gravity of the evermore convincing argument for a connection between football and lasting brain trauma. He was forced at this point to recognize that it was no longer an issue that the organization could simply sweep under the rug. To conclude the summit, Goodell and Casson held a press conference where each made a statement assuring the safety of the players. Goodell assured the press their doctors were making "excellent decisions" in terms of player safety "proven by the six year study [they] [had]." Citing the Mild Traumatic Brain Inquiry committee's research provided Goodell another opportunity to divert a direct answer about the lasting effects of concussions.  Casson more specifically targeted the root of the CTE question by stating that "he is a man of valid science, and [Julian Bailes' case] was not scientifically valid data." Releasing this statement put the final seal on the NFL's decision to stand by ignorantly ignoring any risk to their players. It also represented a stalemate between the sides.  A large, and quickly growing, amount of evidence had been resented from a number of sources that the NFL simply chose not to believe. However, the NFL had the nation's attention waiting to see wha the next move would be. Publicly announcing the players should not worry about long term effects of concussions once again gave Casson the upper hand with the the ability to mold public opinion.  Their press conference which aired on televisions nation wide provided yet another instance where the NFL was able to use the media to their advantage to try to divert the issue away from public attention in order to maintain their popularity.

  By acting only in the interest of their social standing, the NFL prompted discontentment from players who had a growing understanding of the issue. Chris Nowinski, college football player and professional wrestler, was one of these people dissatisfied by the dismissive nature surrounding CTE research. Also being a public figure without a direct tie to the NFL, Chris recognized he had the ability to bring more publicity to the issue. Having participated in two of the most extreme contact sports, Nowinski said he would "be a fool to not worry about CTE personally." He recognized that given his athletic history there was a large change that he would eventually suffer fro CTE. Nowinski joined a team of leading Alzheimer's researchers at the Boston University CTE center. He aided the cause by personally contacting families of deceased football players and asking them to donate the brain of their player. Wife of former Tampa Bay player Tom Mchale not only donated her late husbands brain but also acted to gathered other wives of suffering to deceased players. Together they addressed the NFL in place of their husbands who were no longer able to in hopes of reaching a resolution. The group of researchers, lead by Lisa Mchale, chose to bring their work to the general public at the NFL's most celebrated day of the year, Super Bowl Sunday. Their hope was that by holding a press conference in Tampa Bay right next to the stadium, the millions of media personnel present would jump at the opportunity to partake in another major story.  This group's idea was the first major move to use the same platform as the NFL to address this issue. Although they were a smaller form, they knew the press had the ability to make even a single person's story front page news. Their press conference, however, stood no chance against the colossal spectacle that was the Super Bowl. A very small number of reports covered their presentation. However, it was still just enough attention to catch the eye of the NFL. 

  Unknown to anyone at the time, the NFL had finally reached a turning point in their beliefs about concussions in football. The league finally took this step of considering the possibility that there is a correlation or causation between football and long term brain injury in response to the results of their own study. Casson invited Mchale to the NFL headquarters to present her most recent findings. Mchale presented to the scientific committee along with lawyers discussing the best way to maintain their reputation when in the face of the concussion issue.j The League could no longer ignore this issue now that the specific people they wanted to listen to were telling them what they did not want to hear; there is a connection between playing football and brain trauma. Naturally, the League did not plan to admit to their years of ignorance. For such an admission would mar the League's credibility. One person, however, leaked the internal research document to New York Times reporter Alan Schwartz; who had been involved in reporting the developments in the NFL concussion issue since the player safety conference. The study, condoned by the League itself, asked former players if they had been diagnosed with dementia, alzheimer's or any other memory loss disease. Their results proved that football players had a far higher rate of brain injuries than the general public. The publication of this study once again launched the concussion issue onto headlines across America. This time, in a way the NFL could not control.

  News of the NFL's obvious attempt to hide their knowledge about danger to their players soon caught the attention of the Congress.  Goodell, along with the rest of the National Football League administration, was called to a trial of public opinion. Congress asked Goodell directly, in front of the entire nation, if he "stood by the idea that concussions do not hurt professional football players." Goodell tried his usual tactic of diverting that question to his team of scientists but congress did not accept that. Multiple congressmen pointed out that it was a simple yes or no answer; yet, the commissioner could not utter a coherent answer beyond the stating that he was not qualified to discuss the topic. Without being able to successfully hide his lack of confidence in his previous testimony, the NFL's time skirting the problem was up. The public now knew. The NFL was pressed to admit why they continued to deny what their own personal team had proven to be true, and they could not pull together a complete honest answer. The inability to speak the truth about the matter lead Representative Linda T. Sanchez to draw the analogy between the NFL and 1990's tobacco companies after highlighting the Leagues "blanket denial or minimizing of the fact that there may be this link." Being compared to companies who refused to admit that smoking tobacco could lead to health problems, although very applicable, was a nightmare for the National Football League.  The League's deception was so transparent, the NFL spokes person, speaking to Schwartz in response to the leaked study, was the first in the NFL to succinctly admit that there was a "clear connection between playing football and long term brain trauma." Following the congressional hearing, Casson resigned. A new committee was formed, a billion dollars was donated to the Boston University CTE research center. The center was named the League's preferred brain bank in hopes of ameliorating their public image disaster. Even with the public having a more lucid idea about the dangers of playing football, the League continues to delay questions about the complete picture of this issue off to the indefinite future. Goodell continued to muddle around the simple question of whether not he acknowledged the link between football and brain injuries.  

  Unlike most other corporations, the NFL has still managed to grow and make a record-breaking profit despite all of their scandals. They're seeming immunity to any falter is a main argument Andrew Brandt, experienced sports executive and NFL business analyst, cites as evidence for his argument that football will never fade away. Brandt highlights the fact that even when the brand, as a whole, is suffering, the NFL's popularity and value continue to increase.  There is no evidence to dispute the fact that as long as there is a product to watch, the majority of households across America will continue to turn to their T.V.s Monday, Thursday, and Sunday nights to watch a contest of the National Football League. However, Brandt does not take into consideration the possibility of a day where there is no longer a product. He details the irony in the many viewers that have taken time to watch documentaries about the many wrong doings of the League, then right after proceed to watch that night's game. However, viewing the games, or buying jerseys is deistically different than participating. As Omalu noted, even the NFL recognizes that "if 10% of mothers in this country would begin to perceive football as a dangerous sport- that is the end of football." Most parents will not prevent their children from watching football just as they did growing up. But with increasing evidence of cases of CTE starting as early as high school and youth football due to accumulation of sub-concussive blows to the head, there is a decreasing change parents will be lining up to engage their child in an activity that could permanently wreck their mind. A decrease in football players across America would, admittedly, take a long time to effect the elite few that make it to professional football. However, it would eventually result in a decrease of the product produced, despite the consistent consumption. A decrease in players could hinder the "unstoppable growth" that is the National Football League.

